



NATURE OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CHALLENGE

ROUNDTABLE FINAL REPORT

FEBRUARY 23-24, 2006



DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY



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Major Dave Dudas
Major Chris Hornbarger



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United States Military Academy
Department of Social Sciences

Public Diplomacy Project

Co-sponsors:

The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation

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The United States Military Academy Association of Graduates

The United States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
West Point, New York 10996

May 5, 2006

Department of Social Sciences

The United States Military Academy will hold its forty-third annual Senior Conference, entitled *Public Diplomacy: Message, Process, Outcomes*, from June 1-3, 2006, at West Point, New York. In preparation for this high-level gathering, the Department of Social Sciences has convened two, one-day roundtables, bringing together senior officials and experts to examine key facets of the public diplomacy challenge. Our first roundtable, held in October 2005 and entitled *Answering the Terrorist Message*, focused on the importance of countering the violent jihadist message.

This report captures key insights from our second roundtable, *The Nature of the Public Diplomacy Challenge*, held February 23-24, 2006, here at West Point. A small but diverse group of practitioners and experts engaged in open and frank discussion, and the event achieved our goal of highlighting and exploring key issues that will help us frame the Senior Conference in June.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to our February guests and speakers: Bill Casebeer, General (Retired) Wayne Downing, Paul Hanley, Dr. Jan Kubik, Dr. Dan Kuehl, Josh Rushing, Dr. Kori Schake, Jim Snyder, and Tom Wuchte. Your candid insights have enriched an important national debate, and your participation has made a valuable contribution to West Point's enduring mission to educate, train, and inspire our Nation's future leaders. Thanks also to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the United States Army Eisenhower National Security Series, the USMA Association of Graduates, and the USMA Combating Terrorism Center—this roundtable would not have been possible without their partnership and generous support. I would also like to recognize Major Dave Dudas for his superb performance organizing and executing a first-rate event.


Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michael J. Meese".

Michael J. Meese, Ph.D.
Colonel, U.S. Army
Professor and Head
Department of Social Sciences

THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CHALLENGE

America’s image has suffered – not only in the Middle East and among Muslim populations, but among traditional allies. In Kuwait, which America fought to liberate from Iraq less than fifteen years ago, barely a quarter of the population views the United States favorably. In France, Germany, and even the United Kingdom, public animus towards America has greatly increased the political costs of public support of the United States, significantly complicating, if not limiting, our strategic flexibility. While “public diplomacy” has traditionally referred to government efforts to influence foreign audiences, this definition has been increasingly blurred: messages intended for American citizens are received abroad; messages for foreign audiences are received at home; and, key audiences, such as Muslim communities living both in the United States and abroad, straddle the distinction between “domestic” and “foreign.” Anti-American messages – attractive to audiences that transcend geography, culture, language, and social status – can be powerful, consistent, and difficult to counter. Globalization and the Internet level the playing field between governments and networks of individuals. The government’s role in transmitting American values pales in comparison to American cultural and business influence around the globe, yet it is unclear whether American marketing savvy helps or hinders U.S. efforts to influence foreign audiences. Even if it helps, that advantage has not been effectively harnessed to support U.S. international policy. Clearly, America has stumbled in articulating a clear and consistent message. Furthermore, it is clear that the United States must significantly improve the mechanisms designed to coordinate and deliver a coherent message.



Source: Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005.

FOCUS OF THE FEBRUARY ROUNDTABLE

In recent years, particularly since 9-11, the U.S. Government has struggled to develop and implement policies that reflect the importance of culture and the various means by which different cultures receive, interpret, and respond to messages. American public diplomacy often seems shaped by an assumption that, given the chance, individuals of all cultures would welcome the opportunity to live in an idealistic “American” society. This general assumption

has often reduced the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. message abroad and hindered the building of a strong multilateral coalition to fight terror.

Our discussions in February focused on understanding the nature of the public diplomacy challenge in the current international and strategic environment. Do past public diplomacy efforts and historical case studies provide useful lessons to today's challenge? Can a theoretical understanding of how people in one country and culture receive, interpret, and respond to messages from other countries and cultures help shape our public diplomacy effort? Can the U.S. Government establish a more effective organizational structure to clarify public diplomacy responsibilities, focus our efforts, and enhance the coordination among key agencies? How does the open and instantaneous nature of today's media complicate efforts to influence foreign audiences? In sum, what factors and conditions – strategic, cultural, organizational and technological – must the United States consider in developing and implementing effective public diplomacy today?

	'99/'00	2002	2003	2004	2005
	%	%	%	%	%
Canada	71	72	63	–	59
Britain	83	75	70	58	55
Netherlands	–	–	–	–	45
France	62	63	43	37	43
Germany	78	61	45	38	41
Spain	50	–	38	–	41
Poland	–	79	–	–	62
Russia	37	61	36	47	52
Indonesia	75	61	15	–	38
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23
Pakistan	23	10	13	21	23
Lebanon	–	35	27	–	42
Jordan	–	25	1	5	21
Morocco	77	–	27	27	N/A ¹
India	–	54	–	–	71
China	–	N/A	–	–	42

1999/2000 trends from Office of Research, U.S. Dept. of State; Canada from Environics.

Source: Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005.

The goal of our February roundtable was to provide a meaningful and rigorous understanding of the nature of the public diplomacy challenge, in order to inform and enhance the discussions and outcomes of June's Senior Conference. Our panel discussions were structured around four objectives:

- Understand more fully the means by which various cultures communicate and interpret messages;
- Determine the various agents of public diplomacy and whether the U.S. government can establish a more effective organizational structure;
- Discuss the implications are of an open and instantaneous media environment; and
- Consider lessons learned, and next steps for public diplomacy and national security strategy.

SPEAKERS AND PARTICIPANTS

Full biographies of the following participants, including Department of Social Sciences faculty, are included in the Appendices.

- Major William D. Casebeer, Ph.D., U.S. Air Force, Program Fellow, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University
- General Wayne A. Downing, U.S. Army (Retired), Chair, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy

- Mr. Paul Hanley, Director of Strategic Communications for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Dr. Jan Kubik, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University and Recurring Visiting Professor of Sociology at the Center for Social Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
- Dr. Dan Kuehl, Ph.D., Director, Information Strategies Concentration Program, National Defense University
- Mr. Josh Rushing, Correspondent and Host, Al Jazeera International
- Dr. Kori Schake, Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies, United States Military Academy
- Mr. James Thomas Snyder, U.S. Information Officer, Division of Public Diplomacy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Mr. Thomas A. Wuchte, Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Department of State

CULTURAL FRAMING: BEYOND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS OF COMMUNICATION


Without an understanding of intercultural communication, U.S. public diplomacy is doomed to failure. U.S. public diplomacy must therefore address and understand communication that transcends the more “pedestrian” and “common sense” ways culture works and intermingles with politics. Semiotics – the study of symbols – is one way to understand the nuanced way that ideologies take shape and are articulated. These understandings include the various ways cultures receive, process, and interpret messages – not only from oral and written products, but from any human product (for example, landmarks, heroes, artifacts, political ideas and institutions) that can be interpreted as a statement.¹ Products that are closely associated with particular cultures (the American flag, the Statue of Liberty, Abraham Lincoln, and Disneyworld) provide people with the basic assumptions with which they view the world. With proper understanding and sensitivity, a sender can harness the symbols of other cultures to credibly and effectively capture and convey ideas from his own culture – in short, the receiver hears and understands what the sender means.

Significant to the formation of a “collective ideology” is how individuals process and assess incoming information, much of which is the result of cognition and culture. These processes are shaped by information that is acquired throughout the course of an individual’s development. They are a function of both the character of the mind and the external

¹ Jan Kubik, *Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (Pennsylvania University Press, University Park, PA:1994) P. 13

environment to which the individual belongs. Cognitively, early psychoanalytical studies suggest that the mind contemplates messages both holistically and sequentially. This is of great importance with regard to the various “filters” – cultural, social, economic, and political – with which individuals process information.

Culturally, from a semiotic context, the legitimacy of US public diplomacy is a process in which cultures interpret a given action, institution, regime, or social order by relating non-ideological cognition or “common sense” to a system of shared values contained in root paradigms and dominant symbols of a given group.² This can be problematic when messages intended for a domestic audience are received internationally. Clifford Geertz, a political anthropologist, argues that “political authority requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it.”³ To illustrate, President Bush’s speech from the United Nations provides a cultural framework with which to advance universal assumptions regarding terrorism. The exegetic dimension – interpretation – provides a clue to the symbolic importance of the United Nations, and the perception that anything associated with it denotes its historical importance in resolving inhumane acts of terror. In addition, the exegetic dimension provides the user with a cloak of legitimacy. President Bush’s symbolic speech at the United Nations on 10 November 2001 began with:



“we meet in a hall devoted to peace...every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization...we will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence...the United Nations was founded in this cause...in the Second World War, we learned there is no isolation from evil...we affirmed that some crimes are so terrible they offend humanity itself, and we resolved that the aggressions and ambitions of the wicked must be opposed early, decisively and collectively before they threaten us all...that evil has returned, and that cause is renewed...history will record our responses and judge or justify every nation in this hall...the civilized world is now responding...we act to defend ourselves and deliver our children from a future of fear.”

² Kubik suggests – as do Gerth and Mills (1953, 277) – that those in authority within institutions and social structures attempt to justify foreign policy by linking it to cultural frameworks or symbols. These symbols help to facilitate the legitimacy of a particular action, however, when these symbols are not “widely” accepted, they can have the unintended affects that give rise to various social movements/revolutions.

³ Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as Cultural System” (1964). In *Ideology and Discontent*, eds., David E. Apler. New York: Free Press.

The content of President Bush's speech may have been less effective had it been delivered from the Oval Office or Senate floor. By delivering it from the United Nations with an audience of the General Assembly, however, gives added credibility to President Bush's authority and the policies that the United States government wishes to advance. Though there is division regarding the relevance of the United Nations, its exegetic dimension provides political authority with a culturally universal symbol, which is analogous with peace. With respect to the opposition, they too make claims regarding the legitimacy or credibility of the exegetic dimension. In anticipation of the General Assemblies' meeting, al Qaeda denounced the United Nations and called the secretary-general a "criminal" and condemned all Arab nations belonging to the United Nations as "traitors to Islam." In the case of the opposition, the United Nations credibility was attacked and its de-emphasis articulated in order to provide an antithesis to President Bush's claims. In this case, the United Nations was defined in two contrasting ways, which alludes to the importance of the symbolic space from which the message was delivered. . Messages that come from the highest levels of government must therefore be carefully crafted to fit a culturally accepted framework, since messages that fall outside of the axiomatic realm of culturally accepted myths require the sender to either emphasize or soften certain aspects of the message for it to be both credible and effective.

In sharp contrast, an ineffective cultural frame – one whose cross-cultural appeal was extremely limited – was President Bush's *spectacular* landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln. On 1 May 2004, the President flew in on a Navy S-3B Viking jet that landed on the flight deck, where he emerged from the aircraft garbed in a flight suit, looking every bit the Commander and Chief. While the message may have been culturally acceptable, and seen as perfectly legitimate from an American perspective, it certainly raised many eyebrows abroad. Thus, cultural frames that are inconsistent with the non-ideological cognition of international audiences may have the unintended affects of igniting animus towards U.S. foreign policy and limiting the scope of its influence.

Socially, forwarding liberal democracy can be tricky business, since Western concepts of democracy focus on the autonomy of the individual committed to a public good. Some political anthropologists suggest that these social filters are obscured in states such as Iraq, and that these societies are bound by different social structures that divide worlds into "us" and "them."⁴ Economically, Western societies view the role of gender equality as an important component of liberal democracy, however, the views of non-Western societies vary widely with regard to inclusion and suffrage. In an address in September of 2005, which included women students, faculty, and professionals at a Saudi University, Karen Hughes, the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy was met with staunch resistance. Many of the women present argued that Western society assumes Arab-Muslim women are unhappy with their roles and would welcome changes that are more in line with Western values and the role of women in these societies. Politically, the state has a privileged position in the domain of cultural production, which can further complicate the process for the sender. A main function of a political filter is to produce ambiguity and diminish the

⁴ John Tierney, Example on Iraqi kinship structures from *Iraqi Family Ties Complicate American Efforts for Change* (NYT: September 28, 2003)

ability of the receiver to distinguish those values that are commonly accepted by a group or culture, and those that are foreign. Thus, cultural, social, economic and political filters obscure the sender's message, often leading to interpretations that are different from what was originally intended.

Can the United States develop a coherent message suitable for both the domestic and international audience given this understanding of cross-cultural differences? The nature of American society and the decentralized structure of our government preclude institutionally centralized messaging. Is this necessarily a bad thing? No. American society is attractive because there is not a centralized cultural policy; because we permit cultural diversity and many views and voices; and because our system of government is a decentralized system in which federal, state, and local governments share power, and in which separate institutions share and check one another's power. Historically, the former Soviet Union attempted a centralized cultural policy, and that policy writ large failed because of the various nuances between and among cultures. The United States should not just emphasize democracy, but focus on other aspects of liberalism – inclusions, openness, dissent, evolution, creativity, and moderation. American public diplomacy should convey the diversity and variety of its voices, and emphasize that the great melting pot is an experiment that continues to evolve, with many different senders communicating no “single America.”⁵

Missed opportunities? The passing of tenth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords seems to be one of those unique opportunities to show U.S. foreign policy is not centered on imperialistic power politics. With plummeting favorability of U.S. image abroad in 21 of 27 countries polled, the Bush administration missed an opportunity to provide a counter narrative in the Arab-Muslim world. Had President Bush addressed the international community from Sarajevo, focusing the narrative on ending the genocide of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, and addressing the current presence of U.S. forces – a fraction of what it was in 1995-6 – is one example of a credible cultural frame, which may have been effective had it been properly executed by the administration.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

President Eisenhower, proposing defense reorganization in 1958, noted that good organizational structures don't guarantee success, but bad ones guarantee failure. The September 2004 report of the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Strategic Communication observed that “...substance and structure are integrally related. Good organizations can help shape good outcomes.” Are the United States government's structures and processes up to the task of crafting and implementing coherent and effective public diplomacy policies?

The policy debate about the government's public diplomacy organization has been advanced by a substantial number of serious and thorough reports by government agencies, task forces,

⁵ Most of the theoretical concepts that are covered in this section are directly attributed to Jan Kubik's discussion regarding *Cultural Understandings of Communication* which was presented during the February Roundtable discussion.

advisory boards, academic institutions, and think tanks.⁶ Meanwhile, the government has implemented a steady drumbeat of initiatives to reform existing organizations with key public diplomacy roles, create new ones, and improve the structures and processes for coordinating policy among departments and agencies. These initiatives include, but are not limited to:

- In 1999, the Congress folded the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State, and the Department split USIA's functions between the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), and the Department's regional bureaus. In tandem with this action, the Congress established the position of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (now occupied by Karen Hughes), and President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive-68 (PDD-68), entitled "International Public Information," which technically remains in effect but in reality has been overcome by events.
- In 2001, the White House created the Coalition Information Center (within the Executive Office of the President) to coordinate messages regarding the War on Terrorism. The Center disbanded in 2002.
- In 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the secretive Office of Strategic Influence, which it disbanded in 2002 and replaced with the Office of Strategic Communications.
- In 2002, the National Security Council (NSC) established a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for Strategic Communications.
- In 2003, the White House established the Office of Global Communication (OGC).
- In 2004, the NSC replaced the PCC for Strategic Communications with the PCC for Muslim Outreach.
- In 2004, the Congress expanded the functions of the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and created a subordinate Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources to carry-out long-term strategic planning.

Animating the public diplomacy policy debate has been the notion (perhaps assumption) that the United States needs a coherent message, consistently delivered in a timely fashion. The first part of that idea (coherence) deals largely with what should happen *in* Washington, and the initiatives listed above all attempt to address that issue. The second part (consistent and timely delivery) arguably deals more with what should happen *between* Washington and the field. Our roundtable discussion touched both questions, though largely focused on the second.

Coherence – What Should Happen in Washington?

Discussions about how to organizationally or procedurally improve policy coordination, coherence, and effectiveness among federal agencies invariably tread time-worn paths. The issues may change, but the solutions have been part of the Washington landscape since World War II:

- Creation of a policy “czar” within the Executive Office of the President (e.g. the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy), or independent of the White House (e.g. the new Director of National Intelligence), with sufficient statutory and/or budgetary authority to compel departments and agencies to cooperate.
- Designation of a “lead agency” with clear authority and responsibility (e.g. the Department of Homeland Security for domestic incident response).
- Creation of new, or elevation of existing, advisors to the President (e.g. creating the positions of Deputy National Security Advisor and Director of the Office of Combating Terrorism; and Director of Homeland Security, in October 2001), usually in charge of a new bureau of staffers (e.g. the Office of Combating Terrorism; the Office of Homeland Security), and frequently perceived as being “close to the President.”
- Creation of entirely new interagency policy councils (e.g. the National Economic Council in the Clinton Administration), or creation of new policy coordinating councils (PCCs) and interagency working groups within the NSC or Homeland Security Council (HSC) systems.
- Transfer of a sub-Cabinet agency from one existing department to another (e.g. the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from Treasury to Justice), or the folding of a previously independent agency within a larger department (e.g. USIA into State).
- Creation of a new Cabinet department to subsume agencies with overlapping authorities and missions (e.g. the Department of Defense; the Department of Homeland Security), and hence subordinating previously independent agencies (e.g. the Army and Navy under DoD; FEMA under DHS).
- Creation of a new independent agency (e.g. CIA, NASA, EPA, and, at the time, the Centers for Disease Control), or a new subordinate agency (e.g. the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in DHS) for critical missions.
- Creation of quasi-independent partnerships between separate Cabinet departments (e.g. the Terrorist Screening Center, the National Counterterrorism Center).
- Clarification of missions and functions (e.g. the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces; the distinction between “crisis management” and “consequence management” in Presidential Decision Directive-39: US Counterterrorism Policy).

- Strengthening of career services (e.g. the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986).

It is worth noting that the most successful reforms tend to be those that create something wholly new (DoD, CIA, NASA, CDC). Reforms aimed at transforming existing organizations, structures, and processes have generally yielded only modest improvements, often with great difficulty. Reforms aimed at simply improving centralized policy coordination seem to have had little real impact over time. Reforms that have focused on the “people aspect” of change seem to pay off, though have taken many years to yield tangible results. Of course, the US government is in a period of dramatic institutional reform across our national security and foreign policy apparatus, and it will be a long time before the results of those innovations become clear. Considering the long and rich track record, it is worth considering whether lessons from these previous endeavors can usefully inform efforts at improving public diplomacy.

Few of the post-9-11 organizational initiatives in public diplomacy seem likely to yield marked improvement. For example, the President has elevated the public diplomacy function by appointing a trusted confidant (Hughes) to the Undersecretary position at State, provided clear guidance that State is the lead agency for public diplomacy, has created new coordinating committees within the NSC, and has created a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Global Outreach (currently Michele Davis). But the President’s practice of appointing confidants to important positions hasn’t increased the effectiveness of the organizations they lead. Designating lead agencies for functions that are inherently carried out on a day-to-day basis by many agencies is fundamentally a semantic exercise (i.e. designating the Department of Treasury as the lead agency on economic matters, or the Department of Justice on law enforcement matters, has little practical impact). The new public diplomacy PCCs are simply the latest in a laundry-list of such committees created since 9-11. And creation of the Deputy National Security Advisor positions (recommended by the Defense Science Board and others) doesn’t appear terribly significant considering that there are currently no fewer than *seven* Deputy National Security Advisors.⁷

Some have lamented the decision to fold USIA into State, though this is probably a sterile discussion. Times have changed. While the bureaucratic woes of reorganization have surely inhibited the functions that USIA so effectively carried out for years, and undoubtedly eroded the morale of a generation of career professionals, USIA operated in a communications and diplomatic environment that is markedly different than today’s. As our third panel explored, our government is but a small (and diminishing) voice among many in transmitting America’s message, and has far less control over the substance and means of how our message reaches the ears of foreign publics than was the case in USIA’s heyday. That is not to say that there are not critical lessons to be drawn from USIA’s experience, or critical insights drawn from USIA’s veterans. It is only to acknowledge that were USIA still to exist,

⁷ Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security (i.e. Deputy National Security Advisor), J.D. Crouch; Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs (Faryar Shirzad); Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism (Juan Zarate); Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Policy (Elliott Abrams); Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform (Peter D. Feaver); Special Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan (Meghan O’Sullivan); and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Global Outreach (Michele Davis).

it would be undergoing a “change or perish” transformation not unlike that faced by Xerox or Smith-Corona.

To be sure, government needs to do what it does well, and organization and process matter a lot, but we should be realistic as to the extent to which organizational and procedural refinements can improve US public diplomacy. Says Richard Posner in his recent work on intelligence reform: “A reorganization is a questionable response to a problem that is not a problem of organization.”⁸

“Crossing the Last Three Feet”—What Should Happen in the Field

Our roundtable discussion focused mostly on the issue of how to accomplish the “most important aspect of public diplomacy:” “crossing the last three feet.” While coordination in Washington is one thing, it doesn’t necessarily mean that policy is being effectively coordinated with and implemented by officials abroad. Moreover, while a consistent message from Washington might be essential, it must be coupled with flexibility, immediate responsiveness, creativeness, and aggressiveness in the field. American public diplomacy must be guided by a coherent strategy, but implemented tactically in a decentralized manner which emphasizes initiative as much as consistency.

Jim Snyder outlined a “campaign model” to help structure public diplomacy efforts in the field. A public diplomacy approach with fails to bridge an overarching, long-term vision and message with focused, short-term priorities, has significant shortcomings – broad thematic messages get lost in specifics. A campaign model has the benefit of orienting effort on a focused goal for a limited duration, with measurable results. It can be replicated for new situations, and can effectively and quickly capitalize on actionable intelligence. Officials in the field can shape campaigns that translate and “socially market” broader themes to fit a specific audience and help change how people think and behave. A campaign model incorporates tried-and-true features of decentralized execution: push command and communications down to the lowest level; flatten structures and push responsibility to the field; reward initiative; and operate aggressively and continuously within an overarching intent. A campaign model provides a good framework within which to reach out to foreign, ethnic, and cultural communities in the United States, who are in touch with family, friends, and developments in their native countries.

Tom Wuchte outlined the current Administration’s public diplomacy approach as coordinated by Undersecretary Hughes, and offered insights that dealt with coordination in Washington. Mr. Wuchte also outlined the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as an example of an organization that has succeeded in integrating public diplomacy into the execution of the organization’s larger mission. According to Mr. Wuchte, the OSCE is an organization that is misunderstood but which has successfully shifted its emphasis from its Cold War roots to current threats, and provides a forum that supports weekly meetings among allies to share ideas about how best to communicate with countries outside the United States and Europe. Mr. Wuchte also advanced the idea that the field

⁸ Richard A. Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 127.

should have the freedom and incentive to experiment, test ideas, and see which messages are effective and which are not. Several discussants expressed some skepticism with this approach, insisting it would muddy an already mixed message and increase the likelihood of major communications blunders.

As the discussion progress, the group questioned the assumption that the United States *should* develop a coherent and consistent message to “speak with one voice.” The lack of a centralized message, and the multiplicity and diversity of voices in the United States, perhaps best conveys one of America’s greatest attributes. While our bureaucratic approach is to exercise control over the message and how it is delivered, this may well be counterproductive. Greater decentralization could be better. A broad variety of voices could speak louder than voices in unison. Letting “other flowers bloom” to open as many possible paths of communication – for example, cultural exchanges and funding and support of libraries abroad – might be more effective at transmitting America’s values.

Definitions Matter

Most discussions about how to improve public diplomacy (including ours) quickly turn-to the topic of definitions (for a partial list, see Appendix F). Does lack of definitional clarity contribute to our public diplomacy challenge? Do definitions drive how agencies and organizations think of and carry out their missions and functions? Our conversation did not explore these questions thoroughly, but it is worth considering how the distinctions between and overlaps among various definitions affect our efforts: public diplomacy, public affairs, public relations, cultural diplomacy, strategic communications, information operations, and psychological operations are all terms that describe current government efforts and initiatives.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AN OPEN MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

In an era of instantaneous messaging, information becomes global with a “flick of a switch” or a by the “touch of a button.” The new global and open media environment has made public diplomacy challenging, where market and information technology imperatives determine the degree of autonomy of the state, and its ability to craft effective messages. National public diplomacy efforts are now vulnerable to world news services such as CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera, whom operate around the fundamental principles of supply and demand. In addition, vast interactive information technologies have become what Barber refers to as an “ideology that travels at 186,000 miles per second.”⁹ Thus, the time for crafting messages has evaporated, senders have to know what to say and immediately inform other organizations within the government to limit inconsistencies between agencies. Messages that vary in content become “targets of opportunity” in an open media environment further complicating U.S. Public Diplomacy efforts. Should the result be a “drumbeat” simplistic message?

⁹ Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, *The Atlantic Monthly* Volume 269, Number 3 (March 1992), pp53-65

One of the general assumptions leading up to the conference was that the United States should develop a coherent and centralized message, focusing various agencies towards a public diplomacy effort of “one voice.” This assumption – driven by market and information technology imperatives – raised questions regarding the fundamental concepts with which our founding fathers envisioned the institutional structure of a U.S. democracy, and its relationship to basic human freedoms such as free press. In fact, the general consensus was to emphasize that there is no specific uniform and centralized message that comes from the United States, and should be articulated as such. Our typical bureaucratic response is to try and control the message, which often cues the media to a potentially damaging story thus reducing the credibility of the U.S. message. Further, the imperative to sell products that are in high demand has led to a market that is heavily weighted towards U.S. news. It’s easy to point out the multiple variations and inconsistencies in the U.S. message, because the market is saturated with these messages. Given these unavoidable truths, U.S. Public diplomacy should focus on drawing linkages to other states policies that are similar to ours, and center the attention on this rather than being all about U.S policies. Fewer messages about us should be the rule, rather than the exception to the rule.

Another issue of contention is not a matter of controlling and confining what comes out of various organizations and news agencies, but that senders have difficulty understanding the new strategic environment with which they operate. Often, messages that are intended for domestic audiences become international news, and are thus taken out of context and misunderstood. While it is difficult to anticipate how a specific message will be spun, senders should be more aware of the various nuances between and among differing cultures. From a semiological standpoint, we have to remember that the Global War on Terror is much bigger than the state of Texas or Washington D.C. for that matter. How we frame our messages – context etc. – can either increase the credibility of our message or increase the likelihood that the message will be ineffective and viewed as incredible – examples...UN speech – good; USS Abraham Lincoln speech – bad; Tenth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords from Sarajevo – missed opportunity.

Given the new strategic environment, cultural and political filters are all the more important to the formation of ideology, and how a particular message is received and interpreted in an open media environment. Here in the United States, seldom do you walk into a coffee shop, bar, or community establishment that you will find the news on TV; in most cases, probably sports of some kind. On the other hand, Middle Eastern cultures are being exposed to the media in group settings, such as local coffee shops and market places thus increasing the likelihood that the message will take on an entirely more powerful meaning of interpretation. In addition, the privileged position of the state in the Muslim media market has a formidable role in shaping the views of individuals, which also enhances the likelihood that messages will be taken out of context. Do these realities preclude the U.S. from reaching these audiences? The revolution in information technologies has increased the various means with which senders can communicate to target audiences. While some technologies such as the internet are not as widely accessible or used by target audiences, they are less susceptible to state censorship. U.S. Public Diplomacy should not ignore these smaller audiences and gear its efforts towards those technologies that provide a free flow of uninterrupted communication.

FRAMING SENIOR CONFERENCE XLIII, JUNE 1-3, 2006

We shaped our October and February roundtables to serve as stepping-stones to June's Senior Conference. We have subsequently refined the Senior Conference agenda to systematically address and logically build-on the questions and issues raised in the roundtables.

Our first roundtable, entitled *Answering the Terrorist Message*, examined the public diplomacy problem as a competition between America's message and ideals and those of our terrorist adversaries. The roundtable focused on the need for US public diplomacy programs to posit a credible "counter-narrative" to challenge the logic underlying the terrorists' call to arms and present a positive vision for America's role in the world. An underlying premise of the first roundtable was that effective public diplomacy initiatives should address the legitimate grievances of the Muslim community while simultaneously de-legitimizing the elements of the terrorist narrative that run counter to the interests of the global Muslim population.

Our second roundtable, entitled *Nature of the Public Diplomacy Challenge* (and the subject of this report), built on our examination of our adversaries' messages by considering the challenges in carrying out public diplomacy in today's environment. If the focus of our first roundtable was "know your enemy," then the focus of our second roundtable might appropriately be termed "understand the battlefield." Our discussions sought to determine what factors and conditions – strategic, cultural, organizational and technological – the United States must consider in developing and implementing effective public diplomacy policies.

June's Senior Conference will take the discussion a step further. Having examined our enemy's message, and having examined the nature of today's public diplomacy challenge, we pose the most important question: "so, what do we do?" The first three plenary sessions, spanning Friday morning and afternoon, tackle this question in a logical sequence by focusing on, in turn: (1) America's message and the ways and means available to deliver it; (2) how our message is perceived; and (3) what organization and process is required to effectively shape and deliver our message. We devote all of Saturday morning to the Conference's capstone plenary session, in which we will seek to anchor our previous discussions, to the maximum extent possible, to a plan of action. While we do not expect nor aim to achieve consensus, our goal in the capstone discussion is to be as concrete, prescriptive, and comprehensive as possible, and to articulate recommendations and outline options that could potentially form a "strawman" outline for a *National Strategy for Public Diplomacy*.

Below are the titles and discussion points for each of June's four plenary sessions. Invitees to the June conference will receive a pre-conference packet that includes a more in-depth discussion of each of the plenary session topics.

Plenary Session 1: Carrying America's Message – Ways & Means

- What ideals, values, qualities, traditions, and culture best convey America's enduring identity and purpose?
- With respect to today's world, what messages best capture these attributes?
- What "ways" and "means" are available to carry our messages?
- Which ways and means are appropriate and prudent? Which are likely to be most effective?

Plenary Session 2: Perceptions of America and Its Message

- What factors affect how America and its messages are perceived by foreign publics? What actions and messages are perceived as most inflammatory?
- How are American messages received by Muslim diaspora communities in Western countries? By the variety of publics in the Muslim world? By the publics of traditionally close allies?
- What resonates positively with these audiences, and how best can we foster, enhance and harness that?
- In what ways does this enable, constrain, or hinder US foreign policy?

Plenary Session 3: Ensuring an Effective Government Process

- What organizational and procedural architecture should the US government adopt, and what are the major subordinate roles and activities within that structure?
- What strategic, operational, and tactical activities should the government pursue, and how can the government coordinate that range of activity – across agencies, and between Washington and the field?
- What should the government *not* do, and how can government best work with non-governmental partners?
- How can the government measure progress and results?

Plenary Session 4: Outcomes – Towards a National Strategy for Public Diplomacy

- What vision should a national strategy for public diplomacy articulate?
- What guiding principles should provide the foundation for a national strategy?
- What outcomes – broad or specific – should a national strategy aim to achieve?
- What guidance and direction should a national strategy provide to the executive branch? What role for the private sector should it articulate?
- What specific initiatives warrant inclusion in a national strategy?

APPENDIX A: INVITED GUEST BIOGRAPHIES

Major WILLIAM D. CASEBEER is an intelligence officer in the United States Air Force and a Program Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. He holds degrees in political science from the US Air Force Academy (BS), philosophy from the University of Arizona (MA), and cognitive science and philosophy from the University of California at San Diego (PhD), where his dissertation received the campus-wide outstanding thesis award. Major Casebeer's research interests include military ethics, interdisciplinary approaches to non-state political violence/terrorism, and the neural mechanisms of moral judgment and narrative processing. He is author of *Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition* (MIT Press), and co-author of *Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors* (Lexington Books). Bill has published on topics ranging from the morality of torture interrogation to the neural correlates of moral judgment (in venues such as *Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Biology and Philosophy, and International Studies*), and has experience as a Middle East affairs analyst. Formerly an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Air Force Academy, he is currently studying Middle East affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and conducting research in neuroethics. Bill is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and an Associate of the Institute for National Security Studies. He can be reached at drenbill@earthlink.net.

General WAYNE A. DOWNING, U.S. Army (Retired) is a highly decorated combat veteran who retired after a 34-year career in the U.S. Army. While on active duty he served in a variety of command assignments in infantry, armored, special operations, and joint units, culminating in his appointment as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. He served two combat tours in Vietnam as a junior infantry officer. As a general officer, he commanded the special operations of all services during the 1989 invasion of Panama and commanded a joint special operations task force operating deep behind the Iraqi lines during Operation DESERT STORM. Following retirement, General Downing was appointed by the President to assess the 1996 terrorist attack on the U.S. base at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and to make recommendations on how to protect Americans and U.S. facilities worldwide from terrorist attack.. The resulting report to the Secretary of Defense pointed out significant command failures to adequately protect the base and predicted that terrorist attacks of this nature would be the asymmetric tactic of choice in the future. From 1999-2000, General Downing also served as member of the Congressionally mandated National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission) charged with examining the terrorist threat to the US, evaluating America's laws, policies, and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism directed at US citizens, and recommending corrective actions. The Commission found that the United States needed a far more aggressive strategy on combating terrorism at home and abroad. The Commission predicted further terrorist attacks on America. In 2001, General Downing served the White House as National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. As the President's principal advisor on matters related to combating terrorism, he was responsible for the close

coordination among the military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial operations of our war on terror, and for developing and executing a strategy that integrates all elements of national power. In 2003, General Downing was appointed as the Distinguished Chair of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point where he teaches the Terrorism Studies Seminar. As the Distinguished Chair, he directs the Center's research activities and work supporting the Department of Defense and other agencies efforts in combating terrorism. General Downing serves on several boards in the private sector. He is also a visiting faculty member at the University of Michigan Business School and has conducted seminars on leadership and transformation management. General Downing graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point with a B.S. degree in 1962 and has a M.B.A. from Tulane University. His awards and decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters, the Soldiers Medal, the Bronze Star with V Device for Valor and five Oak Leaf Clusters, the Purple Heart, the Air Medal with V Device and thirty five Oak Leaf Clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with V Device and three Oak Leaf Clusters. General Downing has earned the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Military Free Fall Jumpmaster badge, the Master Parachute Badge, the Ranger Tab and the Pathfinder Badge. He is a Commander in the French Legion of Honor.

PAUL HANLEY was born in England, raised in Arizona and Los Angeles, and educated at Oxford University, Claremont Graduate School, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Before returning to the Pentagon in March 2002 as Director of Strategic Communications for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was founder and Managing Principal of DC Inc., a twelve-year-old consulting firm that specializes in helping small government agencies and non-profits with corporate communication and strategic planning. Recent clients include the Commission on Roles and Missions in the Armed Forces, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the National Defense Panel, the NRO Commission, and the Space Commission. Mr. Hanley was the Director for Public Affairs for the Defense Conversion Commission from its inception in May of 1992 until it completed its work in March 1993. The Commission was responsible for assessing the impact of defense reductions on the U.S. economy, reviewing programs to assist military and civilian defense personnel whose jobs are deleted and examining measures to help defense industries convert to commercial activities. He served 24 years of active duty in the U.S. Navy, mostly as a public affairs specialist, retiring in 1992. Among other assignments he was Director of Public Affairs for the U.S. Atlantic Command and Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia, where he dealt with the first Soviet Navy ship visit to the U.S., the entry of the Defense Department into the counter-narcotics effort in the Caribbean, and the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. Mr. Hanley was the Public Affairs Officer for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon during the escort operations for reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf. Before that he directed public affairs for the National Security Council in the White House. He served from 1983 to 1986 in the office of the Navy's Chief of Information in Washington, having returned from four years' duty in Yokosuka, Japan, where he was Public Affairs Officer first for U.S. Naval Forces Japan, and then for the Seventh Fleet. In 1978 he went to the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, where he served as public affairs officer until the withdrawal of U.S. military forces following Washington's normalization of relations with

Beijing. His early naval career included the Navy Office of Information, Boston, which handles the Navy's media relations in New England, a tour of duty as the Special Assistant to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, and billets as English teacher at the United States Naval Academy, Weapons Officer in the commissioning crew of the gunboat USS Grand Rapids (PG-98), and Special Assistant to the President, U.S. Naval War College. Mr. Hanley is an adjunct professor at American University's School of Communication. He lives in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife, Priscilla, and has two adult children.

Dr. JAN KUBIK, Associate Professor of Political Science, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, USA and Recurring Visiting Professor of Sociology at the Center for Social Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. He received his B.A. and M.A. from the Jagiellonian University in Krakow and his Ph.D. from Columbia University. Kubik is currently working on: (1) a book investigating the relationship between comparative politics and political anthropology (with Prof. Myron Aronoff, Rutgers), (2) a study of cultural legacies of state socialism and their political relevance and (3) a four-state (Taiwan, South Korea, Poland, Hungary) study of civil society and protest politics in post-authoritarian/post-communist states. Among his publications are: *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press (1999) (with Grzegorz Ekiert) and *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland*. University Park: Penn State University Press (1994).

Dr. DAN KUEHL is the Director of the Information Strategies Concentration Program (ISCP), a specialized curriculum on national security in the information age offered to selected senior students at the National Defense University. His courses concentrate on such issues as the information component of national power, information warfare, and public diplomacy. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1994 after nearly 22 years active duty in the USAF. He holds a PhD in History from Duke University, and his dissertation focused on the Air Force's employment of electronic warfare in the decade after WW II. His publications include a wide range of academic and professional journals, and he has contributed to several books on airpower and information warfare. He is on the editorial boards of *Joint Force Quarterly* and the *Journal of Information Warfare*, is a member of the Public Diplomacy Council and the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, and was a member of the Defense Science Board team that wrote the 2004 report on *Strategic Communication*. He lectures internationally on the subject of information warfare, and his current research focuses on the relationship between the information age and national security.

JOSH RUSHING will host a show for Al Jazeera International, a 24-hour, English-speaking, news network set to launch in the Spring of 2006. Rushing spent 14 years as a Marine media liaison. The Texas native became an accidental media star in the film "Control Room", a documentary about Al Jazeera's coverage of the US invasion of Iraq. Since Rushing's resignation from the Corps, he has appeared on every major news network and spoken across America. As a host on Al Jazeera International, he has recently been featured on the Today Show, The Factor with Bill O'Reilly, 360 with Anderson Cooper, among

others. Most recently he can be found profiled in the March edition of GQ and on the cover of the April edition of Fast Company.

JAMES THOMAS SNYDER is the U.S. Information Officer in NATO's Division of Public Diplomacy. He is tasked with outreach to the American legislative, academic, policy and journalism communities. Prior to joining NATO, James served several Members of Congress and legislative committees, work that included relief and reconstruction efforts in Lower Manhattan, Brooklyn and the Pentagon after September 11, 2001. A 1995 graduate of UCLA, James earned a joint J.D.-M.A. in law and international affairs from American University in 2001 where he won the Outstanding Student Award for Scholarship at the Graduate Level. He has written widely on international affairs, law and politics in many publications, including The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Detroit College of Law Review and the Foreign Service Journal. Texas A&M University Press recently published his translation of *Justice in a Time of War*, Swiss journalist Pierre Hazan's history of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. He is married to Lorelei Schweickert, a Foreign Service Officer and 1999 *summa cum laude* graduate of UCLA.

THOMAS A. WUCHTE is a Foreign Affairs Officer at the State Department. He graduated from West Point and received a post-graduate degree in International Relations from the University of Illinois, where he focused on cooperative efforts to eliminate Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons. Mr. Wuchte is currently assigned to the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the State Department. For the past several years, he represented the United States at the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with primary responsibilities for negotiating forward-looking U.S. contributions to the OSCE's 21st Century Security dialogue to address new threats to the region and its participating States. Tom has participated in numerous academic and military exchanges with Russia, Korea, China, Japan, and traveled in the Russian Far East, Northeast Asia, and Middle East for related conferences and events. Mr. Wuchte's current area of research is the establishment of better cooperative security structures in Northeast Asia and the Middle East by looking at European practices and models (e.g., confidence and security-building measures) that have worked in the post-Soviet transition period. Within the OSCE, he has been active in furthering U.S. outreach to the OSCE's Asian and Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, based on the norms and principles of the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). To this end, he co-authored a follow-up presentation for the 2005 OSCE Korea Conference, "The OSCE – Northeast Asian Security & Moving Forward Together with Cooperation Partners," which generated enthusiasm for the idea of an academic network to consider an OSCE model for Asia.

APPENDIX B: USMA STAFF AND FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

Dr. RUTH BEITLER, Ph.d., is an Associate Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics in the Department of Social Sciences. She serves as course director for Middle East Politics and Cultural Anthropology. She is author of *The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas* published by Lexington Press in June, 2004. She has written numerous articles and chapters on the Middle East including an occasional paper co-authored with COL Cindy Jebb, published by the Institute for National Security Studies in July, 2003 entitled, *Egypt as a Failing State: Implications for U.S. National Security*. Her article, co-authored with Richard Shultz, "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al Qaeda Operations" appeared in the *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (June 2004). A graduate of Cornell University with a BA in Near Eastern Studies, Dr. Beitler holds a Master of Arts of Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, where she also received her Ph.D. in International Relations. She has lived and traveled extensively in the Middle East. She has appeared on the CBS Morning Show and MSNBC as a commentator on Middle East affairs.

Major DAVE DUDAS is a Major in the United States Army. He is an International Relations instructor at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Major Dudas's military assignments include service at the Air Defense School, as well as command and staff positions in divisional air defense units, both stateside and overseas, including an operational deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996. Major Dudas is an International Relations and Comparative Politics Ph.D. (ABD) from Rutgers University. He is currently writing his doctoral thesis on the evolution of army doctrine post war era, focusing on cognitive and cultural explanations for doctrinal change. He is married and has three children.

Lieutenant Colonel JOSEPH FELTER, Ph.d., a career Special Forces and Foreign Area Officer, is the Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and an instructor in the USMA terrorism studies program. His military experience includes service as a platoon leader with the 75th Ranger Regiment and as a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha and Company Commander in the 1st Special Forces Group. As a military attaché in Manila, he planned and coordinated combined efforts to develop the counter terrorist capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Felter is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, earned a Masters degree from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and received his Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. His dissertation assesses the impact that quality and structures of state internal security forces have on efforts to combat insurgency and terrorism.

Dr. JAMES FOREST, Ph.d., is Director of Terrorism Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Combating Terrorism Center. He teaches course on international relations (SS307) and information warfare (IT460), and serves as course director for Political

and Economic Development of Sub-Saharan Africa (SS485). Also, in coordination with the U.S. Department of Defense regional centers for strategic studies, he is developing the ASD/SOLIC Junior Leader Counterterrorism Curriculum initiative. Prior to this position, Dr. Forest served for three years as Assistant Dean for Academic Assessment at the U.S. Military Academy. His publications include: *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes* (3 volumes; Praeger Publishers, 2005); *Homeland Security: Controlling the Security Environment* (with COL Russell Howard and MAJ Joanne Moore; McGraw-Hill, 2005); *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Annotated Bibliography* (Combating Terrorism Center, 2004; online at: <http://ctc.usma.edu>); *Higher Education in the United States* (ABC-CLIO, 2002); and *University Teaching: International Perspectives* (Garland Publishing, 1998); as well as articles in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* and the *Journal of Political Science Education*. Much of his work has addressed issues on globalization, education, technology, and organizational knowledge transfer, and his current research focuses on teaching and learning in the world of terrorism. He is currently coauthoring a book with MAJ Matt Sousa on energy security and terrorism in West Africa. Dr. Forest received his undergraduate degree from Georgetown University (BS in Foreign Service) and holds graduate degrees from Stanford University and Boston College.

Major CHRIS HORNBERGER is a Major in the United States Army. He is an instructor and Senior Associate in the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. From November 2001 until March 2004, Major Hornbarger served as Director for Policy and Plans and later Director for Military Programs in the Homeland Security Council at the White House, where he helped develop and implement the President's *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the President's proposal for the Department of Homeland Security, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (now the National Counterterrorism Center) and the Terrorist Screening Center. Major Hornbarger was also principally responsible for United States-Canada homeland security cooperation, integrating US agencies and coordinating development and implementation of the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan. He led the US interagency team that negotiated with Canada and Mexico to develop the security component of the Security and Prosperity Partnership, a trilateral accord to build on the success of NAFTA to achieve greater economic and security integration in North America. Major Hornbarger's military assignments include service in the Pentagon in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, as well as command and staff positions in attack helicopter units, both stateside and overseas, including operational deployments to Somalia and Haiti. Major Hornbarger graduated from Princeton University and holds a Masters in Public Administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, where he was awarded the Lucius N. Littauer Fellowship. He is currently a 2006 Senior Fellow in George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute. Major Hornbarger is the author of *National Strategy: Building Capability for the Long-Haul in Homeland Security and Terrorism: Readings and Interpretations*. He is married and has three children.

Colonel CINDY JEBB, Ph.d., is a Professor, USMA and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences. She teaches courses in Comparative Politics, International Security, Cultural Anthropology, and Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Colonel Jebb has served in numerous

command and staff positions in the United States and overseas, to include tours with the 1st Armored Division, III Corps, and the National Security Agency. Before reporting to the United States Military Academy, she served as the Deputy Commander of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade, which supported NSA. During 2000-2001, she served as USMA Fellow at the Naval War College (2000-2001), where she taught the graduate-level course on Strategy and Force Planning. She has two books published in 2004: *Bridging the Gap: Ethnicity, Legitimacy, and State Alignment in the International System*, (Lexington Publisher) and *Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity*, co-authored with P.H. Liotta (Praeger Publisher). *The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy Versus Terrorism* (co-authored with P.H. Liotta, Thom Sherlock, and Ruth Beitler) is due out in 2006. Colonel Jebb received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University in 1997, a MA in Political Science from Duke in 1992, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 2000, and a BS from the United States Military Academy in 1982.

Ms. LIANNE KENNEDY-BOUDALI, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Professor Kennedy-Boudali holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University where she specialized in International Security Policy and Middle East Affairs. She served for two years as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Niger, and has also lived in Morocco. Professor Kennedy-Boudali's research interests include terrorism in North Africa, strategic communication in terrorism and counter-terrorism, and the process of political-religious radicalization.

Colonel MIKE MEESE, Ph.d., is a Professor, USMA, and Deputy Head of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. From 2003-2004, he was assigned as the United States Military Academy Fellow at the National War College where he taught National Strategy, Military Policy, and Bureaucratic Politics courses. In 2003, he deployed as special advisor on political, economic, and military issues for MG Dave Petraeus, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), in Mosul, Iraq. From January to July 2002 he served as Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducting peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations.

His dissertation is entitled *Defense Decision Making under Budget Stringency: Examining Downsizing in the United States Army*. His research examines budget decisions during previous military reductions with implications for improving defense effectiveness today. In 2001, he assisted the Army Science Board Team that examined alternative approaches to Headquarters, Department of the Army organization. He served as the executive director of the Professional Staff of the Department of Defense Panel on Commercialization and Globalization (the Dawkins Panel) that examined the opportunities and risks associated with current changes in the defense and business sectors. He has been a visiting lecturer on the U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. In May 1998, he was part of a two-person team that traveled to South Africa to assess and assist the transformation and integration of the South African National Defense Force. He has participated in four Marshall Center Partnership-for-Peace Conferences as rapporteur and co-author of the final conference proceedings on the subjects of Defense Economics, Extremism, Transformation, and Crime and Corruption. In June 2004, he co-

chaired the USMA Senior Conference on “Defense Transformation and the Army Profession.”

He is a field artillery officer with previous assignments with the 7th Infantry Division (Light), as a Battery Commander in the 3rd Armored Division in Germany, and as a Battalion Operations Officer and Deputy Division Operations Officer in the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. He is a graduate of the National War College, an honor graduate of the Command and General Staff College, a distinguished graduate from the U.S. Military Academy, and holds a Ph.D., MPA and an M. A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

He has written several papers and articles concerning economics and national security and is the author and editor of the *Armed Forces Guide to Personal Financial Planning*, published by Stackpole Books in 1998. He is a member of the American Economics Association, the Western Economics Association, and the International Studies Association. He lives in West Point, New York with his wife, Ramona, and their three children.

Major (Promotable) SUZANNE NIELSEN, Ph.d., is an Academy Professor and the Director of the International Relations and National Security Studies Program at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. She is responsible for all aspects of the international politics program, which is one of the largest undergraduate majors at the Academy. Major Nielsen also chairs the Academy’s Scholarship Committee, which selects and prepares cadets to compete for post-graduate programs to include the Rhodes, Marshall, Truman and Gates Scholarships and the East-West Center Fellowship.

Her dissertation, *Preparing for War: the Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform*, is about the process of organizational change and particularly focuses on the transformation of the US Army during the 1970s. This work won the American Political Science Association’s Lasswell Award for the best dissertation completed in the field of public policy in 2002 and 2003. In addition to military change, her research interests include civil-military relations and strategy. She published a monograph entitled *Political Control over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective*, as well as several chapters in *The Future of the Army Profession* and articles in *International Studies Perspective*, *Public Administration and Management*, and *Military Review*.

Major Nielsen is a military intelligence officer who has served in units in the Republic of Korea, Germany and the United States. While commanding an intelligence company, she deployed her unit twice from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Europe to support peace enforcement operations in Bosnia. Prior to returning to West Point in 2005, she was a battalion executive officer and then theater analysis and control element chief in the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade in the Republic of Korea.

A distinguished graduate from the United States Military Academy, she also holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. She was a Marshall Award recipient from the US Army Command and General Staff College and received an M.M.A.S in strategy. A former term member on the Council of Foreign Relations, she is an active member of the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association,

and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. She currently lives in New Windsor, New York.

Dr. KORI SCHAKE is the Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. Since May of 2005, she is also a Fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, where she is writing a book on issues of sustainability in American power. During President George W. Bush's first term, she was the Director for Defense Strategy and Requirements on the National Security Council. She was responsible for advising the President, White House Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor on defense issues, including for the Secretary of Defense's annual review and for the President's annual meeting with the Combatant Commanders; developing Presidential policy initiatives; and orchestrating interagency coordination for all long-term defense planning and coalition maintenance issues. Major projects she contributed to include: the 2002 National Security Strategy that defined post-9/11 priorities for protecting and advancing American interests; conceptualizing and budgeting for continued transformation of defense practices; the global posture review, which was the most significant realignment of U.S. military forces and bases around the world since 1950; creation of NATO's Allied Command Transformation and the NATO Response Force; and recruiting and retaining coalition partners for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior to her work in the White House, Dr. Schake was a Senior Research Professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. In that capacity, she conducted research on policy-relevant defense issues, particularly military transformation, transatlantic security issues, and strategies for dealing with rogue states. While Director for European Programs (1999-2000), she developed a research agenda and assigned responsibilities to 8 research staff and managed two fiscal year budgets. Publications from this time include: *The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran*, with Judith Yaphe (National Defense University Press, 2002), "How America Should Lead," with Klaus Becher (Policy Review, August/September 2002), and "Building a European Defense," with Amaya Bloch-Laine and Charles Grant (Survival, Spring 1999). She has also taught in the faculties of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs. At SAIS, she taught MA and PhD students in the European Studies program. At Maryland, she taught core and elective graduate courses, supervised dissertation and masters' theses, and served on faculty selection and admissions committees. From 1990-1996, she worked in Pentagon staff jobs, first in the Joint Staff and then in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She has received the MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Award, and academic fellowships from the Smith-Richardson Foundation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Other honors include the 2004 Distinguished Alumnus Award from University of Maryland School of Public Affairs and outstanding performance awards from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

Ms. THALIA TZANETTI, is a Research Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy. Ms Tzanetti received a B.A. in International Political Studies from the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece, and a Master of International Affairs (MIA) from Columbia University, specializing in International Security Policy and

Humanitarian Affairs. Before joining the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, she worked at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Greek Ministry of Economy and Finance and at the United Nations Development Program in Tunis, Tunisia. Ms Tzanetti's current research focuses on terrorist motivations, terrorist communications and on Muslim diasporas communities in Europe.

APPENDIX C: SENIOR CONFERENCE 2006 PRÉCIS

SENIOR CONFERENCE XLIII PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: MESSAGE, PROCESS, OUTCOMES

West Point, New York
June 1-3, 2006

The United States Military Academy (USMA) Senior Conference is an annual event administered by the Department of Social Sciences on behalf of the Superintendent, USMA. The conference provides a forum for distinguished representatives – from government, academia, the think-tank community, the media, business, the joint military services, and the international community – to discuss topics of national security importance.

Senior Conference 2006, our forty-third gathering, will address the formidable challenges that America faces carrying-out its public diplomacy effort in an international security environment that is significantly less supportive than in previous decades. Our image has suffered – not only in the Middle East and among Muslim populations, but among traditional allies. In Kuwait, which America fought to liberate from Iraq less than fifteen years ago, barely a quarter of the population views the United States favorably. In France, Germany, and even the United Kingdom, public animus towards America has greatly increased the political costs of public support of the United States. While “public diplomacy” has traditionally referred to government efforts to influence foreign audiences, this definition has been increasingly blurred: messages intended for American citizens are received abroad; messages for foreign audiences are received at home; and, key audiences, such as Muslim communities living both in the United States and abroad, straddle the distinction between “domestic” and “foreign.” Anti-American messages – attractive to audiences that transcend geography, culture, language, and social status – can be powerful, consistent, and difficult to counter. Globalization and the Internet level the playing field between governments and networks of individuals. The government’s role in transmitting American values pales in comparison to American cultural and business influence around the globe, yet it is unclear whether American marketing savvy helps or hinders U.S. efforts to influence foreign audiences. Even if it helps, that advantage has not been effectively harnessed to support U.S. international policy. Clearly, America has stumbled in articulating a clear and consistent message. Furthermore, it is clear that the United States must significantly improve the mechanisms designed to coordinate and deliver a coherent message. These are only some of the issues that this year’s Senior Conference will engage.

The conference provides a perfect forum -- sequestered and informal settings at West Point -- for assembling a distinguished group of participants for two days of informal discussions. Keynote speakers will suggest new directions for analysis and three panels will focus on key aspects of the challenges the United States faces in leveraging all its elements of power to produce an effective public diplomacy strategy. Throughout all of these sessions, there will be a free and candid exchange of ideas among all participants. All comments are “not for attribution.”

The primary goal of the conference is to enrich senior participants' understanding of the U.S. public diplomacy problem. In addition, the conference will serve as a springboard for research in the Department of Social Sciences and the USMA Combating Terrorism Center. Finally, it is envisioned that the conference (while strictly "not for attribution") will generate timely and succinct synopses and analyses of the discussions, for distribution to the conference participants, and specifically tailored for consumption by policymakers and practitioners.

The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Army's Eisenhower National Security Series, the USMA Association of Graduates, the USMA Combating Terrorism Center, and the Department of Social Sciences are partnering to produce Senior Conference 2006.

APPENDIX D: SENIOR CONFERENCE 2006 AGENDA

	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Location</u>
Thursday, June 1, 2006		
12:00 p.m. -	Check-in & Registration	Hotel Thayer
5:30 – 6:30 p.m.	Icebreaker / Reception	Hotel Thayer
6:30 – 7:45 p.m.	Dinner Buffet	Hotel Thayer
8:00-8:45 p.m.	Opening Address	Hotel Thayer
9:00 p.m. -	After Dinner Mixer	Hotel Thayer
Friday, June 2, 2006		
7:00 – 8:00 a.m.	Full Breakfast Buffet	Hotel Thayer
8:00 – 8:15 a.m.	Transportation to Kimsey Center	Hotel Thayer
8:30 a.m. – 10:00 a.m.	Plenary Session 1: Carrying America’s Message – Ways & Means <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What ideals, values, qualities, traditions, and culture best convey America’s enduring identity and purpose? • With respect to today’s world, what messages best capture these attributes? • What “ways” and “means” are available to carry our messages? • Which ways and means are appropriate and prudent? Which are likely to be most effective? 	Kimsey Center

10:15– 11:45 a.m.	Plenary Session 2: Perceptions of America and Its Message	Kimsey Center
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What factors affect how America and its messages are perceived by foreign publics? What actions and messages are perceived as most inflammatory? • How are American messages received by Muslim diaspora communities in Western countries? By the variety of publics in the Muslim world? By the publics of traditionally close allies? • What resonates positively with these audiences, and how best can we foster, enhance and harness that? • In what ways does this enable, constrain, or hinder US foreign policy? 	
12:00-1:00 p.m.	Lunch	Kimsey Center
1:00-3:00 p.m.	Plenary Session 3: Ensuring an Effective Government Process	Kimsey Center
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What organizational and procedural architecture should the US government adopt, and what are the major subordinate roles and activities within that structure? • What strategic, operational, and tactical activities should the government pursue, and how can the government coordinate that range of activity – across agencies, and between Washington and the field? • What should the government <i>not</i> do, and how can government best work with non-governmental partners? • How can the government measure progress and results? 	
3:15 – 3:30 p.m.	Option 1: Transportation to Hotel (or)	Kimsey Center
3:15 – 4:30 p.m.	Option 2: Bus Tour of West Point	Kimsey Center
5:30 – 5:45 p.m.	Transportation from Hotel Thayer to South Dock	Hotel Thayer
5:45 – 7:00 p.m.	Hudson River Cruise	South Dock
7:15 – 8:15 p.m.	Dinner	West Point Club
8:15 – 9:15 p.m.	Keynote Address	West Point Club
9:15 – 9:30 p.m.	Transportation to Hotel Thayer	West Point Club
9:30 p.m. -	Evening Mixer	Hotel Thayer

Saturday, June 3, 2006

7:30-8:30 a.m.	Full Breakfast Buffet	Hotel Thayer
8:30-11:30 a.m.	Plenary Session 4: Outcomes – Towards a National Strategy for Public Diplomacy (with break) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• What vision should a national strategy for public diplomacy articulate?• What guiding principles should provide the foundation for a national strategy?• What outcomes – broad or specific – should a national strategy aim to achieve?• What guidance and direction should a national strategy provide to the executive branch? What role for the private sector should it articulate?• What specific initiatives warrant inclusion in a national strategy?	Hotel Thayer
11:30 a.m.-1:00 pm.	Lunch and Concluding Address	Hotel Thayer
1:00 p.m.-	Departure of Participants	Hotel Thayer

APPENDIX E: ABOUT SENIOR CONFERENCE

The Department of Social Sciences at West Point has convened Senior Conference every year since 1963, with the sole exception of 1969. The conference provides a forum for distinguished representatives – from government, academia, the think-tank community, the media, business, the joint military services, and the international community – to discuss topics of national security importance.

The Conference serves two primary purposes:

- (1) Facilitate a vigorous and candid exchange of ideas among policymakers and experts; and
- (2) Help the Academy accomplish its mission: to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country; to professional growth throughout a career as an officer in the United States Army; and to a lifetime of selfless service to the Nation.

West Point provides the ideal and fitting setting - the oldest, continuously occupied military installation in the United States; a key strategic outpost throughout the American Revolution; and since 1802, the home of the Nation's premier leadership development institution.

PREVIOUS SENIOR CONFERENCES - 1963 TO 2006

2005 Special Operations Forces and the War on Terror

Banquet Address: LTG William G. Boykin

Banquet Address: MG Herbert Altschuler

Concluding Address: BG (R) Russel Howard

2004 Defense Transformation and the Army Profession

Banquet Address: Major General James M. Dubik

Banquet Address: Honorable James Marshall

Concluding Address: LTG Franklin L. Hagenbeck

2003 Combating Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities in the Use of Power

Banquet Address: Dr. Bruce Hoffman

Luncheon Address: The Honorable Edwin Meese III

Banquet Address: GEN (R) Wayne A. Downing

2002 Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century: Training & Educating for New Roles & Missions

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General William Tangney

Banquet Address: Honorable Robert Andrews

2001 The Future of the Army Profession

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General (R) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr.

Banquet Address: Professor Andrew Abbott

Concluding Address: Brigadier General William G. Webster, Jr.

2000 Emerging Threats and Their Consequences for U.S. National Security Policy

Banquet Address: General Richard B. Myers

Banquet Address: Ambassador Richard Butler

Concluding Address: Dr. David S.C. Chu

1999 NATO at 50: Perspectives and Prospects

Banquet Address: Honorable Marc Grossman

Banquet Address: General Wesley Clark

Concluding Address: Honorable Robert Hunter

1998 National Military and Civilian Service

Banquet Address: Honorable Dave McCurdy

Banquet Address: Honorable Harris Wofford

Concluding Address: Mr. Steven Waldman

1997 Security, Strategy, and Statecraft

Banquet Address: Dr. E. Randolph Jayne II

Banquet Address: Honorable William Perry

Concluding Address: Dr. Jane E. Holl

1996 Faces of Battle: Contending Visions of Future Warfare

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Wesley K. Clark

Banquet Address: Professor John Keegan

Concluding Address: General (R) Barry R. McCaffrey

1995 The Role of the Military in Preventing Deadly Conflict

Banquet Address: General Gordon R. Sullivan

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose

Concluding Address: The Honorable Jack Reed

1994 The Army and Society in the 21st Century

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman

Banquet Address: Admiral William A. Owens

Concluding Address: Lieutenant General William E. Odom

1993 Coping with Conflict and Change in Central Eurasia

Banquet Address: Honorable Paul Wolfowitz

Banquet Address: Sir Brian Urquhart

Concluding Address: GEN (R) John R. Galvin

1992 The United States and The Atlantic Alliance

Banquet Address: Sir Michael Quinlan

Banquet Address: The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz

Concluding Address: General John R. Galvin

1991 Unburdening the Past: Forging America's Army for the 21st Century

Banquet Address: Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson

Banquet Address: General Edward C. Meyer, Retired

Concluding Address: General Gordon R. Sullivan

1990 The Decade of Challenges: U.S. Intelligence in the 1990s

Banquet Address: Honorable William E. Colby

Banquet Address: Honorable Frank C. Carlucci

Concluding Address: Professor Loch K. Johnson

1989 Seeking Conventional Stability in Europe: Force Enhancements & Arms Control

Banquet Address: Major General William F. Burns, Retired

Banquet Address: Honorable M. Benoit d'Aboville

Concluding Address: Dr. Fred Ikle

1988 U.S. National Strategy in the 1990s

Banquet Address: Dr. Edward Luttwak

Banquet Address: Professor Samuel P. Huntington

Concluding Address: Mr. R. James Woolsey

1987 NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, and Implications for the Future

Banquet Address: General (R) Andrew Goodpaster

Banquet Address: His Excellency Joseph M.A.H. Luns

Concluding Address: Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski

1986 The Pacific Basin: An American Strategy for the 1990s

Banquet Address: Mr. Seiichiro Ohtsuka

Banquet Address: Mr. Zhang Jingyi

Concluding Address: General Richard G. Stilwell

1985 Vietnam: Did It Make A Difference?

Banquet Address: Ambassador Robert W. Komer

Banquet Address: Honorable William P. Bundy

Concluding Address: Dr. Robert E. Osgood

1984 Defense Technology

Banquet Address: Dr. William J. Perry

Banquet Address: Professor John Keegan

1983 The Nuclear Debate: Rationality, Morality, Security, and Stability

Banquet Address: Honorable George Ball

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft

1982 The "Military Reform" Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the Century

Keynote Address: Representative Newt Gingrich

Banquet Address: General Edward C. Meyer

1981 Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning

Keynote Address: Mr. Norman Augustine

Banquet Address: General Alton D. Slay

1980 Defense Manpower Planning

Keynote Address: Honorable Robert B. Pirie

Banquet Address: Professor Charles Moskos

1979 The Role of the Military in National Security Policy Formulation in the 1980s

Keynote Address: Dr. Walt W. Rostow

Banquet Address: Mr. Richard C. Steadman

1978 Integrating National Security & Trade Policy: The US & the Soviet Union

Keynote Address: Lieutenant General James M. Gavin

Banquet Address: Dr. Samuel P. Huntington

1977 National Compulsory Service

Keynote Address: Dr. David P. Taylor

Banquet Address: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky

1976 Arms Transfers

Keynote Address: Dr. John F. Lehman, Jr.

Banquet Address: Professor Geoffrey Kemp

1975 Changing Security Interests in an Evolving World Order

Keynote Address: Honorable Paul Nitze

Banquet Address: Professor Graham T. Allison

1974 Educating the Professional Soldier

Keynote Address: Honorable Barry Goldwater

Banquet Address: Professor Morris Janowitz

1973 The American Army and Changing National Priorities

Keynote Address: Professor Marion Levy

Banquet Address: Honorable Robert F. Froehlke

1972 A Reappraisal of the Future of NATO

Keynote Address: Honorable Robert F. Ellsworth

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny

1971 The Nixon Doctrine in Asia

Keynote Address: Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

Banquet Address: Honorable Marshall Green

1970 The Changing Role of the Military in American Life

Keynote Address: Honorable Robert E. Osgood

Banquet Address: Professor Adam Yarmolinsky

1969 No Conference

1968 Problems for United States Policy: Tangiers to Teheran

Keynote Address: Honorable Paul Warnke

Banquet Address: Ambassador Charles Yost

1967 Support of the US Foreign Policy with Military Resources in Conditions of Internal Violence

Keynote Address: Honorable Thomas L. Hughes

Luncheon Address: Honorable Frank Pace, Jr.

1966 United States Security Policy and Asia, 1966-1976

Keynote Address: Honorable U. Alexis Johnson

Banquet Address: Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster

1965 The Role of the Military in National Security Policy Formations

Keynote Address: Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster

Banquet Address: Honorable Solis Horowitz

1964 Latin American Problems

Keynote Address: Honorable David E. Bell

1963 New Nations and Their Internal Defense

Keynote Address: Dr. Walt W. Rostow

SENIOR CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES - 1963 TO 2006

1963 CPT Ames Albro
1964 CPT Ames Albro
(CPT Americo Sardo may have served as Executive Secretary in either 1963 or 1964)
1965 MAJ John W. Seigle
1966 MAJ William L. Hauser
1967 MAJ Dana G. Mead
1968 MAJ William E. Odom
1969 No Conference
1970 LTC William M. Wix
1971 MAJ John R. Landry
1972 MAJ James R. Ellis
1973 MAJ Peter H. Ward
1974 CPT Jack H. Jacobs
1975 CPT Roger J. Arango
1976 MAJ Waldo D. Freeman
1977 CPT James R. McDonough
1978 CPT William L. Robinson and CPT Ralph D. Crosby
1979 CPT Gregory D. Vukisch
1980 CPT Eric T. Olson
1981 MAJ Henry A. Leonard
1982 MAJ Peter W. Chiarelli
1983 LTC Jeffrey S. McKittrick
1984 LTC John S. Lilley
1985 MAJ Douglas E. Lute
1986 MAJ Lonnie S. Keene
1987 MAJ David H. Petraeus
1988 CPT David S. Clark
1989 MAJ Jeffrey Long
1990 MAJ Kevin R. Cunningham and MAJ Dennis A. Lowrey
1991 MAJ Robert L. McClure
1992 CPT Mark D. Smith
1993 MAJ Wally Z. Walters, Jr.
1994 CPT Clemson G. Turregano
1995 MAJ William D. Woolf
1996 MAJ Mark L. Rosen
1997 MAJ Douglas Henry
1998 CPT Grant R. Doty
1999 LTC Mark Fassio (Left for Command) and CPT William B. Ostlund
2000 CPT William B. Ostlund
2001 LTC Kevin Dopf
2002 MAJ Charles Miller
2003 MAJ Joanne C. Moore
2004 MAJ Elizabeth Robbins
2005 MAJ Jeffrey C. Denius
2006 MAJ Chris Hornbarger

APPENDIX F: DEFINITIONS

Public Diplomacy

"Public Diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences." (source: Planning Group for Integration of USIA into the Department of State, June 20, 1997).

"Public Diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television." (source: U.S. Department of State, *Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, 1987, p. 85).

"Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad." (source: United States Information Agency).

"Public diplomacy . . . deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications." (source: Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, Tufts University).

"Public Diplomacy - the open exchange of ideas and information - is an inherent characteristic of democratic societies. Its global mission is central to foreign policy. And it remains indispensable to [national] interests, ideals and leadership role in the world." (source: US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 1991 Report).

"Public Diplomacy is the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around the world. (source: The Djerejian Report, 2003).

"To inform, engage, and influence global audiences. . . to reach out beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics and sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign societies. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of programs that

employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and electronic media, and other means." (source: United States General Accounting Office, September 2003).

"The means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise and influence on their foreign policy decisions." (source: Edmund A. Gullion, former diplomat, Dean of the Fletcher School, March 1966).

"Public diplomacy - effectively communicating with publics around the globe - to understand, value and even emulate America's vision and ideas; historically one of America's most effective weapons of outreach, persuasion and policy." (source: Jill A. Schuker, former Senior Director for Public Affairs at the National Security Council, July 2004).

"The conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments." (source: Alan K. Henrikson, Professor of Diplomatic History, April 2005)

"Official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the U.S. and other nations." (source: Hans N. Tuch, author of *Communicating with the World*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990)

Public Affairs

"Public Affairs is the provision of information to the public, press and other institutions concerning the goals, policies and activities of the U.S. Government. Public affairs seeks to foster understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens and other groups and institutions, and domestic and international media. However, the thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience."

Civil Affairs

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate

military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (source: Joint Pub 1-02).

Propaganda

Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (source: Joint Pub 1-02)

Psychological Operations


Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (source: Joint Pub 1-02)



SENIOR CONFERENCE XLIII

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: MESSAGE, PROCESS, OUTCOMES

JUNE 1-3, 2006



The Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation



U.S. Army Dwight D.
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